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1. Although the terms prejudice and discrimination are often used interchangeably
within the context of racism, for the purposes of this comment, the terms racism,
prejudice, and discrimination will be discussed according to the specific
definitions put forth in 5 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (G. Lindzey &
E. Aronson 2d ed. 1969). Racism is defined as any negative attitude or behavior
which is directed at another based solely on their racial composition and some
inferred knowledge (ie., stereotypes), rather than on direct experience with the
individual. Subsequently, prejudice may be defined as the holding of a negative
attitude (i.e., the attitudinal component of racism) toward an individual based on
his or her categorical membership (ie., black, white, hispanic, etc.), while
discrimination denotes an individual's negative behavior (ie., the behavioral
component of racism) toward another based on his or her categorical
membership. See G. ALLPoRT, NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1958). This distinction
between a prejudicial attitude and a discriminatory behavior is an important one
which will be continuously referred to throughout this comment. See Harding,
Proshansky, Kutner & Chein, Prejudice and Ethnic Relations, in 5 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 2d ed. 1969).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The controversy surrounding the issue of juror competence has ex-
isted for almost as long as juries themselves.2 This controversy has
been fueled by a number of critics who argue that jurors lack the nec-
essary competence to skillfully assess the facts of a case and to set
aside biases created by personal prejudices.3 Specifically, it has been
suggested that juries, "fail to recall the evidence accurately, become
confused by complex trials or those involving multiple defendants,
and are often swayed by legally irrelevant information." 4
Loh suggests that this critical view of juror competence and objec-
tivity is rooted in a "historical distrust in the judgment of amateurs,
untutored in legal subtleties and inexperienced in evaluating evi-
dence."s This distrust continues to be voiced by a number of scholars
despite empirical studies which demonstrate that jurors tend to be rel-
atively competent fact-finders.6 Wigmore, in one of the first empirical
studies on jury decision-making, suggested that jurors were fairly ad-
ept at identifying the factual elements of a case, even in the face of
testimonial errors by witnesses. 7 Subjects in this study were asked to
deliberate upon the testimony of witnesses who were reporting on a
staged incident. The results indicated that during the course of delib-
erations, subjects identified more facts than would be expected from
the testimonial errors.
Likewise, in their classic study on jury decision-making, Kalven
and Zeisel found that there was a high degree of similarity between
verdicts reached by juries and those a presiding judge would have
reached.8 This study involved the analysis of data collected from ap-
proximately 500 judges across the United States. Judges were asked
to complete a questionnaire following each jury trial they presided
over and document the jury verdict as well as their personal verdict.
Analysis of the subsequent 3,576 cases indicated a high degree of corre-
spondence between verdicts reached by judges and juries. Specifically,
it was found that judges agreed with 78% of the jury verdicts analyzed.
2. S. KASSiN & L. WRIGHTsMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 3 (1988).
3. Id. at 4.
4. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 1, 1 (1987).
5. Loh, Perspectives on Psychology and Law, 11 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 314,
328 (1981).
6. V. HANS & N. VmMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 129 (1986).
7. J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 698 (3d ed. 1937).
8. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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Additional analyses revealed that of the 22% of remaining cases where
there were disagreements, trial evidence was not excessively difficult
and judges did not point to that factor as a cause of the difference.
These results suggest, therefore, that the behaviors of juries and
judges are not that different in terms of case disposition.
Yet, despite the above findings, juror skill and objectivity continues
to be an area of controversy for psycholegal scholars, especially re-
garding the issue of juror ability to overcome personal biases when
considering the culpability of a defendant. As such, this comment will
evaluate the empirical evidence employed by critics to support the
contention that, "[j]urors are sentimentalists with bleeding hearts.
They are gullible creatures, too often driven by emotion and too easily
motivated by prejudice, anger, and pity."9
This critical view of juror objectivity is premised upon the belief
that jury verdicts are affected by a large number of extra-evidential
trial factors which ultimately affect their decisions.10 No single factor,
however, has received as much attention as that of race and its effect
on juror decisions. 1 One need only examine psychological,12 sociolog-
ical,13 and legal literature4 to see the extent to which the area has
been investigated.
Although the evidence from the above literature, concerning the
effect of racism on jury decision-making, is far from conclusive, a
number of legal scholars and psychologists contend that juries are in-
9. S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 2, at 4.
10. Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors' Decisions: A Psycholegal Analysis of the Effects of
Victim, Defendan and Case Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 261, 261-62
(1979).
11. Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a So-
ciological Viewpoint, 8 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 357, 367 (1974).
12. See, e.g., V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 6; R. HATI, S. PENROD & N. PEN-
NINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Nemeth, Jury Trials: Psychology and Law, 14
ADvANCES IN EXPEUMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 309 (1981); Nickerson, Mayo, &
Smith, Racism in the Courtroom, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM
255 (J. Dovidio & S. Gaertner ed. 1986).
13. See, e.g., W. WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST C nsiNAL JuSTIcE SYSTEM (1987);
Bullock, Significance of the Racial Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences, 52 J.
CRiM. L., CRmNOLOGY, & PoLIcE Sci. 411 (1961); Spohn, Gruhl, & Welch, The
Effect of Race on Sentencing: A Re-Examination of an Unsettled Question, 16
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 71 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination of the
Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133
(1986)[hereinafter Baldus, Challenge]; Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Monitoring
and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentence Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327 (1985)[hereinafter Baldus, Lessons]; Gross, Race and
Death. The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination in Capital Sen-
tencing, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1275 (1985); Johnson, Black Innocence and the
White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611 (1985).
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herently biased against minority defendants.'5 Individuals who argue
that jurors are not able to put aside their prejudicial attitudes when
deliberating on a case have suggested that the "historical distrust" in
the judgment of jurors has been extended into the specific domain of
racism.16 These arguments have been so persuasive that relatively lit-
tle additional empirical work has been conducted recently in the area
of jury racism.
However, the lack of recent empirical research regarding the role
of racism in juror decision-making should not be taken as a sign that
the issue has been resolved. In order to determine whether jury ra-
cism is in fact playing a decisive role in our courtrooms,17 it is neces-
sary to evaluate the empirical data which is being used to support this
contention.
This comment, therefore, will evaluate both laboratory and archi-
val research in order to illustrate that the available data regarding the
role of racism in jury decision-making does not support the contention
that juror objectivity is adversely affected by the inability to set aside
personal prejudices. Section II of this comment will describe both the
laboratory and archival research which has been conducted in the area
of jury racism. Following this description, section III will evaluate the
limitations of this research.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF JURY RACISM
A. Laboratory Research
There have been a number of laboratory studies conducted which
suggest that mock jurors invariably assign disproportionate outcomes
to black defendants. These studies indicate that mock jurors tend to
assign harsher dispositions to black defendants in comparison to white
defendents, especially if the cases involved a white victim.'8
15. Weiten & Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm" The
Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 71, 72 (1979).
16. See Pfeifer & Daily, Jury Discrimination" Exploring the Psychological and Legal
Limitations of Current Research (1989) (paper presented at the Kansas/Great
Plains Conference, Lincoln).
17. That is, in order to ascertain whether prejudicial attitudes on the part of jurors
are negatively affecting the actual legal decisions they are making regardng the
guilt of the defendant.
18. See, e.g., Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and That of the
Jurors in Determining Verdicts, 5 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 103 (1979); Feild,
supra note 10; Foley & Chamblin, The Effect of Race and Personality on Mock
Jurors' Decisions, 112 J. OF PSYCHOLOGy 47 (1982); Gray & Ashmore, Biasing
Influence on Defendants' Characteristics on Simulated Sentencing, 38 PsycHo-
LOGIcAL REP. 727 (1976); Klein & Creech, Race, Rape, and Bias: Distortion of
Prior Odds and Meaning Changes, 3 BASic & APPLED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 21
(1982); McGlynn, Megas & Benson, Sex and Race as Factors Affecting the Attribu-
tion of Insanity in a Murder Trial, 93 J. PSYCHOLOGY 93 (1976); Ugwuegbu, Ra-
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For the most part, the above studies employ a similar procedure.
Subjects, usually white college students (mock jurors), are asked to
either view a videotape or read transcript segments of a trial in which
the race of the defendant and victim are varied. After the trial presen-
tation, subjects are asked to rate the guilt of the defendant and/or rec-
ommend a sentence. The results from these studies are then discussed
in terms of their implications for actual courtroom trials.19
Included in the above research are a number of studies which in-
vestigated the effect of the defendant's race on juror decisions. One
such study was conducted by Gray and Ashmore2O who had subjects
read a description of a crime in which the defendant's race was varied.
Subjects were told that the defendant was already found guilty and as
such were asked to give their opinion regarding the sentence which
should be imposed. The results indicated that the race and religious
beliefs of the defendant played a significant role in the sentencing de-
cisions of the subjects. Specifically, it was found that black defendants
were assigned longer sentences than white defendants.
McGlynn, Megas, and Benson 2 l also found a significant difference
in guilt attributions based on the race of the defendant. The authors
asked 208 white subjects to rate the guilt of a defendant after reading a
murder trial summary. Subjects were asked to judge whether he was
guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. Results indicated that black
defendants were found guilty in 69% of the cases while white defend-
ants were found guilty in only 54% of the cases.
Bernard22 attempted to provide a sense of increased realism in his
research on jury racism by employing a complex design which varied
the racial composition of the juries as well as varying the race of the
defendant. A total of ten juries were formed with subjects who were
asked to view a videotape of a mock trial in which a white or black
defendant was charged with assault and battery.23 After viewing the
"trial," subjects were asked to cast individual votes regarding the guilt
of the defendant both before and after deliberations. Although the
results of the initial vote were not significant, they do indicate a defi-
nite trend for white jurors to find black defendants guilty more often
than white defendants. Further analysis of the results indicated that
cial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J.
EXPEmIMNTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 133 (1979).
19. See Pfeifer & Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations: A Modern Racism
Perspective (1989)(paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Psy-
chological Association, Halifax).
20. Gray & Ashmore, supra note 18, at 727.
21. McGlynn, Megas & Benson, supra note 18, at 93.
22. Bernard, supra note 18.
23. The juries were comprised of two sets of each of the following racial composi-
tions: 100% white; 75% white/25% black; 50% white/50% black; 25% white/75%
black; and 100% black. Id. at 107.
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racially mixed juries were less likely to illustrate a racist trend than
those wholly composed of blacks or whites.
In addition to the above research, a number of studies on juror ra-
cism have also been conducted by varying the race of both the defend-
ant and the victim. Klein and Creech,24 for example, asked subjects to
view a videotape of a simulated rape trial in which the race of the
defendant and victim were varied. During the videotape subjects were
asked a number of times to rate whether the evidence being presented
was pro-defense or pro-prosecution. Following the videotape, subjects
were asked to rate the guilt of the defendant on a five-point scale as
well as recommend a sentence. According to these authors, the results
suggest that subjects tend to distort their evaluations of evidence in
favor of white victims such that "neutral" evidence was significantly
more likely to be perceived as being pro-prosecution when the victim
was white than when she was black. The results also indicated that
there was a significant difference in sentencing recommendations.
Black defendants convicted of raping a white victim were given signifi-
cantly longer sentences than white defendants.
Using a similar manipulation, Foley and Chamblin25 presented
subjects with an audiotape of a trial describing the case of a male de-
fendant charged with sexual battery of a child. After listening to the
trial, in which the race of the defendant and child were varied, sub-
jects were asked to respond to a five-point guilt scale ranging from not
guilty. to guilty. Results indicate that white jurors are significantly
more likely to find a black defendant guilty of battering a white victim
than a white defendant who batters a white victim.
Like the above studies, Ugwuegbu suggested that his study,
"showed very convincingly that the race of the defendant and the race
of the victim inappropriately influenced the level of culpability the
jurors ascribed to the defendant."26 In support of this observation,
Ugwuegbu presented white mock jurors with a condensed transcript
of an aggravated rape trial in which the race of the victim and defend-
ant were varied. After reading the trial stimulus, subjects were asked
to judge the responsibility of the defendant and whether the defend-
ant acted intentionally. Subjects were also asked to rate the guilt of
the defendant as well as to recommend a suitable sentence. These
four responses were then combined to give an overall measure of de-
fendant's culpability. The results indicated that black defendants
were significantly more likely to be held culpable for their actions
than white defendants, especially if the victim was white.27
24. Klein & Creech, supra note 18, at 21.
25. Foley & Chamblin, supra note 18, at 47.
26. Ugwuegbu, supra note 18, at 143.
27. Id. at 139.
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Feild28 also found that the race of the victim and the defendant
affected the decisions of mock jurors. Feild collected data from 896
white subjects who read a transcript of a mock rape trial in which he
varied the racial composition of the defendant and victim. After read-
ing the transcript, subjects were asked to rate the guilt of the defend-
ant and suggest a sentence. Results of this study also indicated that
black defendants are assigned significantly lengthier sentences than
white defendants, especially if the victim is portrayed as white.
The results of the preceeding laboratory studies have been em-
ployed by a number of individuals to suggest that white jurors cannot
overcome their biases toward black defendants when deliberating on a
case.29 A number of limitations regarding these studies, however,
must be considered before a final appraisal of the research can be
made. These limitations will be discussed in section III.
B. Archival Research
In addition to the preceeding laboratory studies, there have been a
number of archival analyses completed which also suggest that black
defendants are more likely to be convicted and receive harsher
sentences than white defendants in the criminal system.3 0
MEAN RATINGS OF CULPABILITY (WHITE SUBJECTS)
RACE OF VICTIM X RACE OF DEFENDANT
DEFENDANT
WHITE BLACK
WHITE 13.8a (60) 17.2b "(62)'
VICTIM
BLACK 13.6a (60) 14.5ab (62)
Note: Mean values with different superscripts differ from each
other at the .05 level or better by the Duncan Multiple-Range test.
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of subjects in each
experimental group.
28. Fetid, supra note 10.
29. Weiten & Diamond, supra note 15, at 72.
30. See, e.g., Baldus, Challenge, supra note 14; Baldus, Lessons, supra note 14; Bowers
& Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Stat-
utes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Gerard & Terry, Discrimination Against
Negroes in the Administration of Criminal Law in Missouri, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q.
415; Johnson, The Negro and Crime, ANNALs 217 (1941); Partington, The Inci-
dence of the Death Penalty for Rape in Virginia, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 43
(1965); Wolfgang & Riedel, Rape, Race, and the Death Penalty in Georgia, 45 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 658 (1975); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the
Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981); Zimring,
Eigen & O'Malley, Punishing Homicide in Philadelphia: Perspectives on the
Death Penalty, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1976).
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In an early study, Johnson 3 ' examined the data on 660 convicted
capital offenders sentenced to death row in North Carolina in order to
determine whether there were any selective factors operating regard-
ing sentencing. His data indicated a large disparity between the
number of black and white offenders who were executed in North
Carolina between 1909 and 1954.32 Based on these results, Johnson
concluded that "capital punishment operates differentially on the ba-
sis of the type of crime and type of offender."33
In a similar study, Partington examined the incidence of death
penalty sentences for rape cases in Virginia from 1908-1963. Parting-
ton found that,
[t]here is, however, at least the permissible inference, that rape by a Negro
man is a crime in Virginia which has been treated as meriting an extreme
punishment. It is also evident from the facts that Virginia judges and juries
have been less reluctant to impose the death penalty upon Negro defendants
than white.3 4
In support of his argument, Partington pointed to the fact that be-
tween 1908 and 1963 all of the fifty four men executed for rape or
attempted rape in Virginia have been black. 5 In addition to this,
Partington also noted that there was a racial disparity among the rape
cases decided by the Court of Appeals during this period.36 Finally,
Partington suggested that an analysis of sentencing patterns for rape
cases in Virginia between 1908 and 1963 indicated that black defend-
ants were disproportionally sentenced to longer prison sentences. Ac-
cording to Partington, during this period, "Negroes committed 58% of
the rapes and received 62% of the sentences over 20 years; 58% of the
sentences over 10 and under 20 years; and 56% of the sentences under
10 years. Whites committed 42% of the rapes, and received 38% of the
sentences over 20 years; 42% of the sentences over 10 and under 20
years; and 44% of the sentences under 10 years."3 7
Racial differences in sentencing were also alluded to by Gerard and
31. Johnson, supra note 30.
32. Id. at 169. According to Johnson, data regarding the percentage of capital offend-
ers committed to death row in North Carolina who were executed indicate the
following racial disparities: 62% of blacks committed to death row for murder
were executed, while only 43.8% of whites committed to death row for murder
were executed. A similar result is obtained regarding rape (56.4% of blacks exe-
cuted and 42.9% of whites executed) and burglary (26.3% of blacks executed and
0% of whites executed).
33. Id. at 169.
34. Partington, supm note 30, at 62.
35. Id. at 43.
36. "In sum, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has written opinions in seventy-
two rape cases during the period with which this article is concerned. Twenty-
three of the cases involved Negroes: seventeen were affirmed, six reversed.
Forty-nine of the cases involved white men: eighteen were affirmed, thirty-one
reversed." Id. at 49.
37. rd. at 53-54.
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Terry3 8 in an analysis of data collected in Missouri for the American
Bar Foundation's 1962 Nationwide Survey of the Defense of Indigents
Accused of Crime. These authors compared jury verdicts as well as
sentencing decisions for white and black defendants across a number
of criminal offenses and concluded that, "the data clearly showed that
Negroes were treated less favorably than whites."3 9 In support of
their conclusion, these authors referred to the fact that an examina-
tion of 19 cases tried by juries illustrated that 33% of the white defend-
ants were found guilty, while 77% of the black defendants were found
guilty.40 In addition, the data suggested that blacks were more likely
to receive prison sentences (as opposed to fines or probation) than
whites for offenses such as assault, auto theft, forgery, larceny, and
robbery.41
Although it has been argued that the above studies are irrelevant
for any modem analysis of racial disparities because they only reflect
data prior to the early 1960's, Zeisel suggests that the past trends con-
tinue and can be illustrated.4 2 In defense of his argument Zeisel com-
pared the statistical evidence presented in two capital cases, Maxwell
v. Bishop43 and Spinkellink v. Wainwright,44 in order to illustrate
that racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty has
not decreased since Furman v. Georgia.45 According to Zeisel, a re-
38. Gerard & Terry, supra note 30, at 415.
39. Id. at 436.
40. Id. at 430.
41. Id. at 432.
42. We see here the beginning of what has since become a pattern - govern-
ment officials admitting, after it no longer matters legally, that discrimi-
nation has affected capital sentencing and executions, but professing that
such discrimination is all a matter of the past and that the current data
are too scanty to support conclusions of continuing racial discrimination.
Zeisel, supra note 30, at 458.
43. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970)(peti-
tioner offered data to the court suggesting that convicted black defendants were
more likely to receive the death penalty for raping a white victim than convicted
white defendants).
44. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979)(petitioner presented
data suggesting that an analysis of the ratio of current offenders on death row in
Florida to the number of Florida arrests for murder during a felony illustrates a
distinct racial disparity. Specifically, it was suggested that 47% of the black de-
fendants arrested for felony murder of a white victim were sentenced to death.
In comparison, only 24% of white victims arrested for felony murder of a white
victim were sentenced to death).
45. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Supreme Court held that death sentence
statutes in the United States were in violation of the eighth amendment, prohibit-
ing cruel and unusual punishment. Although the rationales of the Justices varied
(nine separate opinions were written), a number of the opinions pointed to evi-
dence suggesting that the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty invited racial
discrimination. Subsequent to this decision, a number of states legislated death
penalty statutes in which an attempt was made to reduce the arbitrariness of the
death penalty process. Typically, states introduced more specific criteria which
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view of the Florida data presented in Spinellink indicates that a
black defendant is 43% more likely to receive the death penalty, for a
murder of a white victim during a felony, than a white defendant. 46
As such, it is argued that differential sentencing based on race still
continues in capital cases.
Evidence regarding the continuation of differential sentencing was
also presented by Baldus and his colleagues who employed a large data
base and more sophisticated statistical analysis to conduct two studies
which examined the archival data from 2,500 cases in Georgia. These
studies also illustrated a trend toward gross discrimination in death
penalty decisions.4 7 After controlling approximately 270 factors (i.e.,
holding constant any variables aside from race which might explain
the disparity in sentencing), these authors concluded that the race of
the defendant and victim played a significant role in determining
whether the death sentence was imposed. Specifically, defendants
who were found guilty of murdering a white victim received the death
penalty in 22% of the cases examined. In comparison, white defend-
ants found guilty of murdering a black victim were sentenced to death
in only 1% of the cases.
Bowers and Pierce 48 also conducted an extensive study of post-
Furman capital sentencing decisions and found evidence for arbitrary
impositions of the death sentence for homicide in Florida, Georgia,
Texas, and Ohio.49 These results led the authors to conclude that,
"[i]n these four states, which accounted for approximately 70 per cent
of the nation's death sentences in the first five years after Furman,
race of both offender and victim had a tremendous impact on the
required the trier of fact to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors in the
particular case they are deciding. A similar statute was upheld four years after
Furman in Gregg v. Georgi, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Because of the significant
changes in the death penalty statutes following Furman, the case is often consid-
ered to signify an important distinction between two eras of death penalty juris-
prudence. Thus, Furman offers a guide for pre/post examinations of
discrimination and the death penalty.
46. Zeisel, supra note 30, at 461.
47. Baldus, Challenge, supra note 14; Baldus, Lessons, supra note 14.
48. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 30.
49. Probability of Receiving the Death Sentence in Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Ohio
for Criminal Homicide, by Race of Offender and Victim (from effective dates of
respective post-Furman capital statutes through 1977).
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chances that a death sentence would be handed down."5 0 These ra-
cially biased results were found even when the type of homicide in-
volved was held constant.5 1
Similarly, Wolfgang and Riede52 examined 361 rape cases in Geor-
gia between 1945 and 1965 in an attempt to examine the effect of both
legal and non-legal factors on decisions to impose the death sentence.
Employing a sophisticated analysis technique to examine the data,
these authors, like the above studies, found that the black defendant/
white victim racial combination was more likely to evoke a death sen-
tence than any other defendant/victim racial combination.
Finally, Zimring, Eigen, and O'MalleyS3 conducted an analysis of
204 homicide cases in Philadelphia since 1970 and concluded that,
"[b]lack defendants who kill white victims receive the life or death
sentence more than twice as often as black felony suspects who kill
black victims."54
The results of the archival studies, like those of the laboratory
studies, have been used to reinforce the suggestion that juries are in-
(1) (2) (3)
Estimated Persons Overall
Offender/Victim Number of Sentenced Probability of
Racial Combinations Offenders to Death Death Sentence
Florida
Black kills White 240 53 .221
White kills White 1768 82 .046
Black kills Black 1922 12 .006
White kills Black 80 0 .000
Georgia
Black kills White 258 43 .167
White kills White 1006 42 .042
Black kills Black 2458 12 .005
White kills Black 71 2 .028
Texas
Black kills White 344 30 .087
White kills White 3616 56 .015
Black kills Black 2597 2 .001
White kills Black 143 1 .007
Ohio
Black kills White 173 44 .254
White kills White 803 37 .046
Black kills Black 1170 20 .017
White kills Black 47 0 .000
Id. at 594.
50. Id. at 596-97.
51. Id. at 598-99.
52. Wolfgang & Reidel, supra note 30.
53. Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, supra note 30.
54. Id. at 232.
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herently prejudiced toward black defendants and, as such, act in a dis-
criminatory fashion when deliberating upon the guilt and sentencing
of the non-white defendant.5 5 However, as with the laboratory stud-
ies, the archival evidence of jury discrimination must also be scruti-
nized before such a conclusion can be drawn.
I. EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
Although the large amount of laboratory and archival evidence
cited above suggests that there is indeed a prejudicial (i.e., attitudinal)
element to jury decision-making, there are a number of methodologi-
cal and conceptual limitations which beg consideration before one may
argue that actual jurors are engaging in racist behavior. Indeed, we
should follow the advice of Justice Frankfurter who suggested that
"we have to be constantly on our guard lest psychology be more une-
quivocal in her wisdom when she speaks to lawyers than when she
speaks to psychologists."5 6 Psychologists, therefore, should be no less
critical when analyzing the outcome of psycholegal research than they
are in analyzing research in other areas of psychology. Thus, the re-
mainder of this comment will examine the empirical evidence regard-
ing jury racism, according to a number of psychological arguments, to
illustrate that evidence of discriminatory racist behavior in jury deci-
sion-making is weaker than has been previously suggested.
A. Limitations of Archival Research
As noted above, evidence regarding jury racism can be separated
into two distinct domains: laboratory research and archival research.
The laboratory research on jury decision-making is aimed at the indi-
vidual level of analysis (i.e., the decisions of individual mock jurors),
while the archival research is aimed at the institutional level of analy-
sis (i.e., discrimination in the criminal justice system generally).S7
Therefore, although both of these domains may suggest that blacks
and whites are treated differently in the legal system, the results from
one domain cannot be used to support the results from the other do-
main. In other words, even though a number of authors cite archival
data as evidence in support of their laboratory research,5s the compar-
ison is not valid because the archival data suggest only that the differ-
ential treatment is occurring "somewhere in the system," it does not
pinpoint the jury as the cause. Baldus himself suggests that there are
55. See, ag., Ugwuegbu, supra note 18, at 134.
56. F. FRANKFURTER, LAw AND PoLrncs 297 (1939).
57. Gibson, Race as a Determinant of Criminal Sentences: A Methodological Critique
and a Case Study, 12 LAw & Soc'y REv. 455 (1978).
58. See, eg., Ugwuegbu, supra note 18, at 134. "Many of these studies were surveys or
archival investigations. However, these data generally indicate that the race of
the defendant and the victim may influence juror judgement [sic]." Id.
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at least four distinct decision points in the judicial system during
which discrimination can play a role in determining whether the
death penalty is imposed.59
A second limitation of archival research lies in the fact that a
number of studies have produced conflicting evidence regarding the
contention that discriminatory sentencing practices exist.60 Kleck, for
example, reviewed fifty-seven published studies on racial discrimina-
tion in criminal sentencing for capital and non-capital offenses. Re-
sults of this analysis indicated that only fifteen of the studies
presented any strong evidence of racial bias. An additional sixteen
studies presented "mixed" findings, and the remaining twenty-six
studies found no evidence at all of racially motivated sentencing
disparity.61
Similarly, a recent report by Klein, Petersilia, and Turner suggests
that knowledge of a defendant's race does not increase the accuracy of
disposition predictions.62 Specifically, these authors analyzed 11,553
California offenders convicted of assault, robbery, burglary, theft, for-
gery, or drug crimes, and developed a model which allowed them to
predict the disposition of the defendant (i.e., probation or prison sen-
tence) with approximately 80% accuracy. Knowledge regarding the
race of the defendant did not enhance the predictive power of the
model. That is, the authors suggest that knowledge of factors such as
the defendant's prior record (e.g., previous adult and juvenile convic-
tions), specific elements of the crime (e.g., use of a weapon, vulnerabil-
ity of the victim), and demographics (e.g., education, mental or
alcohol-related problems) are much more useful in predicting a resul-
tant sentence than knowledge about race.
Therefore, although a number of studies argue that discrimination
does exist within the judicial system, the evidence supporting this
claim is unclear at best. What is clear is that, even when sentencing
59. Baldus, Challenge, supra, note 14, at 139-40. Baldus and his colleagues suggest
that most jurisdictions have at least four "decision points" at which a responsible
authority makes a judgment which "will either keep the defendant eligible for a
death sentence or effectively insulate him from that possibility." The decision
points are as follows:
1. Decision by prosecutor (or grand jury) to charge defendant with capi-
tal murder or a lesser offense.
2. Possibility of plea bargaining in which prosecutor may reduce the
charge in exchange for a guilty plea.
3. Jury decides on guilt of the defendant.
4. Jury (or Judge) decides on sentence.
Id.
60. W. WlLBANxs, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 103-25 (1987).
61. Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of
the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv.
783 (1981).
62. Klein, Petersilia & Turner, Race and Imprisonment Decisions in California, 247
Sci. 812 (1990).
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disparities are documented, there is no conclusive archival evidence
which suggests that juries are specifically responsible for these dispar-
ities. It seems, therefore, that archival research in and of itself does
not present any evidence of jury discrimination, although it does illus-
trate at least some support for the contention that racism does exist
"somewhere" in the justice system.
B. Methodological Limitations of Laboratory Research
Perhaps the most widely held criticism of laboratory research on
jury racism, and jury decision-making in general, revolves around the
external validity limitations which are inherent in these studies.63
This criticism is generally based upon the methodological inadequacies
of the research that arise because most studies do not attempt to repli-
cate all aspects of an actual trial when investigating jury decision-
making issues.
The major experimental procedures which are cited by authors as
detracting from the external validity of results include: 1) the primary
use of college students as subjects;64 2) concentration on aspects of the
juror as opposed to the jury;6 5 3) the realism of the situation;6 6 4) the
use of measures which do not reflect actual trials (ie., using scales of
guilt, or sentencing as a measure of prejudice);67 and, 5) the lack of
some important aspect of the trial situation (ie., instructions, opening
63. External validity can be defined as the degree to which laboratory findings can be
extended or generalized to the real world. D. Coox & D. CAMPBELL, QuAsI-Ex-
PERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS IssuEs FOR FIELD SETINGs 39 (1979).
64. Many authors argue that the responses of college students do not accurately re-
flect the responses one would get from a sample of eligible jurors in a community.
See, eg., Bermant, McGuire, McKinley & Salo, The Logic of Simulation in Jury
Research, 1 CRIM. JusT. & BEHAv. 224 (1974); Davis, Bray & Holt, The Empirical
Study of Decision Processes in Juries: A Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE AND
THE INDrvDuAL IN SocIETY (J. Tapp & F. Levine ed. 1977); Gerbasi, Zuckerman
& Reis, Justice Needs a New Blindfold A Review of Mock Jury Research, 84 PSY-
CHOLOGICAL BuLL. 323 (1977); Loh, supra note 5, at 344; Wilson & Donnerstein,
Guilty or Not Guilty? A Look at the "Simulated" Jury Paradigm, 7 J. APPLIED
Soc. PsYcHOLoGY 175, 176-77 (1977); Weiten & Diamond, supra note 15, at 75-76.
65. It has been argued that concentration on aspects of individual juror decision-mak-
ing tells us very little about the decisions which a jury, as a whole, would make.
Davis & Bray, supra note 64, at 341; Loh, supra note 5, at 344.
66. These researchers suggest that all subjects are aware that they are in an experi-
ment, no matter how realistic the situation, and as such may not act the way they
would if faced with a real judicial decision-making task. Bermant, McGuire, Mc-
Kinley & Salo, supra note 64, at 228; Davis, Bray & Holt, supra note 64, at 350;
Gerbasi, Zuckerman & Reis, supra note 64, at 342-43; Loh, supra note 5, at 344;
Weiten & Diamond, supra note 15, at 81-83.
67. It has been suggested that the use of dependent measures, such as rating guilt on
a seven-point scale, are not reflective of legal procedure (ie., guilty or not guilty)
and therefore provide little useful information. Bray & Kerr, Use of the Simula-
tion Method in the Study of Jury Behavior, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 107, 111-12
(1979); Lob, supra note 5, at 344; Weiten & Diamond, supra note 15, at 79.
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statements, deliberations, etc.).68
Lipton, however, attempted to overcome many of the above criti-
cisms by trying to replicate an actual trial situation while varying the
race of the defendant.69 Subjects were led to believe that they were
participating in an actual trial to determine the guilt or innocence of a
student accused of cheating. Accordingly, the subjects were told that
they were selected to be part of an "Intercampus Grievance Commit-
tee" (ICGC). As part of their ICGC responsibilities, the subjects were
asked to read a number of verbatim transcripts of student disciplinary
hearings and suggest an appropriate disposition which would be ad-
hered to by the university. By varying the race of the accused student,
Lipton found that Hispanics were treated more harshly than whites
with regard to disposition. Although Lipton did find a race effect for
juror decisions, his results are somewhat suspect because of the lack of
jury instructions. 70
The issue of external validity is also alluded to by Bermant, Mc-
Guire, McKinley and Salo who suggest that results from laboratory
research on juries may not be a useful indicator of actual jury func-
tioning because these studies concentrate on functional verisimilitude
as opposed to structural verisimilitude.71 These authors suggest that
researchers are attaching so much importance to the output, or func-
tion, of subjects72 (ie., guilt ratings, sentencing decisions, etc.) that
they are neglecting to attend to the importance of the input variables,
or process, of the phenomenon being studied7 3 (ie., the elements of an
actual trial such as instructions and deliberations) resulting in non-
generalizable findings.
Given the above methodological limitations, it appears that
although many studies on jury racism may illustrate internally valid
68. Some researchers argue that the results of studies which do not incorporate all
aspects of a trial, such as jury instructions and deliberations, provide us with little
information about how a "real" jury would behave. Bermant, McGuire, McKin-
ley & Salo, supra note 64, at 230; Davis, Bray & Holt, supra note 64, at 341;
Gerbasi, Zuckerman & Reis, supra note 64, at 342; Loh, supra note 5, at 341; Pfei-
fer & Ogloff, supra note 19, at 10; Weiten & Diamond, supra note 15, at 77-78.
69. Upton, Racism in the Jury Box: The Hispanic Defendant, 5 HISPANIc J. BEHAv.
Sci. 275 (1983).
70. For a review on the importance of jury instructions in jury decision-making stud-
ies on racism, see Pfeifer & Ogloff, supra note 19.
71. Bermant, McGuire, McKinley & Salo, supra note 64.
72. In terms of a computer analogy, functional verisimilitude can be described as the
throughput and output elements of data processing. In jury research, therefore,
functional verisimilitude would revolve around the concern over whether the re-
sults obtained in the study are reflective of actual jury behavior.
73. Structural verisimilitude is based on a concern for input variables. In jury re-
search, this concern would be reflected by the importance of testing subjects in
situations which exactly mimic a real trial.
[Vol. 69:230
JURY RACISM
findings of prejudice, their techniques of investigation limit their ex-
ternalization to the legal forum.
C. Predictive Limitations of Laboratory Research
As stated earlier, Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein suggest
that racism can be divided into two distinct forms: an attitudinal com-
ponent labeled prejudice and a behavioral component labeled discrim-
ination.74 Given 'this division, it has been suggested that the
procedures being used in laboratory studies on jury racism are primar-
ily tapping into the concept of prejudice as opposed to discrimina-
tion.75 Specifically, subjects in these laboratory studies are being
assessed on their attitudes, or prejudices, as opposed to their behav-
iors. Indeed, Nickerson, Mayo, and Smith refer to the stimulus being
employed in these studies as "veiled attitude questionnaires."7 6
Therefore, the fact that these studies suggest differential treatment of
defendants based on race simply reflects the subjects' differential atti-
tudes toward racial minorities.
Given these attitudinal findings, it is a large and perilous theoreti-
cal leap to assume that there are behavioral consequences which will
naturally follow.77 One cannot simply assume that discriminatory be-
haviors can be reliably predicted in cases where prejudicial attitudes
have been identified,78 even though a number of authors have implic-
itly or explicitly made these assumptions.7 9 The reliability of the atti-
tude/behavior prediction paradigm has led a number of authors to
suggest that there is in fact very little relationship between "attitudi-
nal predictors" and subsequent behavior.80 In fact, one recent study
has found that attitudes become less reliable as predictors of behavior
if the behavior has "significant and far-reaching effects."8 1 In this
study, the subjects' attitudes toward capital punishment were mea-
sured. Following this, the subjects were asked to make a decision in a
mock jury trial involving capital punishment. Before giving their ver-
dict, subjects were reminded to either respond according to their atti-
74. Harding, Proshansky, Kutner & Chein, supra note 1.
75. Pfeifer & Daily, supra note 16.
76. Nickerson, Mayo & Smith, supra note 12, at 258.
77. Davis, Bray & Holt, supra note 64, at 327.
78. Wicker, Attitudes versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behav-
ioral Responses to Attitude Objects, 25 J. Soc. ISSUES 41 (1969).
79. See Weiten & Diamond, supra note 15, at 73-74.
80. This paradigm involves the ability to predict an individual's specific behavior
based on knowledge of his or her attitudes. A number of researchers have argued
that knowledge of attitudes is not particularly helpful in trying to predict an indi-
vidual's subsequent behavior. See, eg., W. MIScHEL, PERSONALrTY AND ASSESS-
MENT (1968); Ajzen & Fishbein, Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical
Analysis and Review of Empirical Research, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 888 (1977).
81. Prislin, Attitude-BehaviourRelationship: Attitude Relevance and Behaviour Rel-
evance, 17 Eun. J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 483 (1987).
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tudes (high attitude relevance) or according to the facts of the case
(low attitude relevance). In addition, subjects were informed that
their decisions would either be used to influence the real jury in this
case (high behavior relevance) or would not influence the real jury at
all (low behavior relevance). The results indicated that the lowest
correlation (ie., degree to which the attitude and behavior variables
were related) was discovered in the high attitude relevance/high be-
havior relevance condition. In contrast, when subjects were led to be-
lieve that their attitudes were relevant but would not play a
significant role in the trial outcome, the correlation between the two
variables increased. Therefore, the argument that these attitudinally-
oriented laboratory studies are solid predictors of actual juror behav-
ior is not a strong one.
Interestingly enough, it has been suggested that the law is more
likely to make a distinction between "bias and action" (ie., a distinc-
tion between attitudes and behaviors) in the realm of jury decision-
making than some psycholegal researchers who are more likely to
equate the two, even though the attitude/behavior question is far from
resolved in psychology.8 2 For example, in McCain v. Employment Di-
vision,83 the Oregon Court of Appeals held that there was a distinct
difference between an employer's sexist attitudes and any subsequent
behavior which that attitude may produce. This opinion seems to pro-
vide a clear indication that at least one court has made an attitude/
behavior distinction in defining discrimination. It seems that in the
realm of attitude-behavior predictability, some cases wholeheartedly
82. Loh, supra note 5, at 335.
Otherwise stated, psychological writings equate potential bias (general
fallibility) with actual bias (mistaken verdict). The law distinguishes
these two elements.... The law's reluctance to assume categorically a
one-to-one correspondence between the potential unreliability (which is
conceded) and its actual impact in a particular trial (which must be
proven) is one reason why the courts have not rushed to embrace expert
psychological testimony.
Id.
83. 17 Or. App. 442, 445, 522 P.2d 1208, 1210 (1974). The court drew a clear distinction
between an individual's attitude and behavior in terms of defining sexism. Ac-
cording to the opinion in this case, even though "[d]iscrimination on the basis of
sex is an unlawful employment practice.... This does not mean, however, that
an employer's 'sexist' attitude, by itself, is an unlawful employment practice or
such other cause as would constitute 'good cause' for a female employe [sic] to
quit. 'Good cause' would exist only if this 'sexist' attitude produced some actual
discrimination, undue harassment, or other grievous cause of reasonable founda-
tion, evidence of which must appear in the record" [citations omitted]. Although
this case deals with sexism, as opposed to racism, one can argue that the same
reasoning would apply since the opinion was based on the Oregon Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act which deals with unlawful employment activities due to race,
religion, color and sex. See On. REv. STAT. § 659.030 (1987).
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adhere to Justice Frankfurter's advice by rejecting psycholegal re-
search data that has yet to be fully accepted in the field of psychology.
D. Correspondence Limitations of Laboratory Research
Even were one to agree that attitudes are a direct predictor of be-
havior, there is evidence suggesting that the relationship between the
attitudes being tapped and the subsequent behavioral predictions will
be very low due to the lack of correspondence between key elements.
Ajzen and Fishbein suggest that attitudes and behaviors will have a
higher relationship if the two correspond in terms of four elements:
target, action, context and time.8 4 In other words, the probability that
one can make a reliable behavioral prediction, based on knowledge of
an individual's attitude, increases in direct proportion to the elemental
correspondence between the two. For example, the probability of cor-
rectly predicting an individual's voting behavior is increased by prob-
ing his or her attitudes toward a specific candidate (target), about
specific issues (context), during a specific election (time). Likewise,
behavioral predictability would decrease if the attitudes were probed
about a generic candidate, regarding genera issues, between election
years.
Given this concept of element correspondence, the contention that
laboratory studies on racism using mock jurors are evidence of actual
jury discrimination is also weakened because these studies lack corre-
spondence with actual trials. The specific details of each study on jury
racism with regard to target (i.e., who the defendant is) and action
(i.e., facts of the case), as well as context and time, do not correspond
to the elements of an actual trial and, as such, are only valuable as
predictors of behavior within the -confines of the study. This argu-
ment is especially important since McCleskey v. Kemp8 5 established
the legal standard for proving discrimination in a capital case as being
dependent on the presentation of evidence which specifically estab-
lishes that the defendant was discriminated against.
It seems, therefore, that the law requires specific evidence of dis-
crimination in capital cases while psychology can only provide general
trends.8 6 While these trends are interesting psychological findings,
their utility as specific indicators of discriminatory behavior by jurors
in a specific case is questionable.
E. Additional Laboratory Research
Finally, there is laboratory evidence suggesting that mock jurors
84. Aizen & Fishbein, supm note 80.
85. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
86. Lob, supra note 5, at 336.
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may not be as inherently biased as previously believed.8 7 Pfeifer and
Ogloff, for example, found that mock jurors in a rape trial tend to be
less discriminatory when they are evaluated according to a stricter
legal standard8s These authors asked subjects to read a transcript of a
rape trial in which the race of the defendant and victim were varied.
After reading the transcript, half of the subjects were asked to rate
the guilt of the defendant on a dichotomous scale (guilty/not guilty)
while the other half were asked to make their judgment on a seven-
point bi-polar scale (from not guilty to extremely guilty). In addition,
half of the subjects were also given jury instructions which specified
the elements of the crime and noted that in order to find the defend-
ant guilty, the State had to prove each element beyond a reasonable
doubt. Results replicated earlier studies in which subjects overwhelm-
ingly rated the defendant as guiltier, regardless of scale employed,
when he was portrayed as being black as opposed to white. These dif-
ferences disappeared, however, when subjects were given jury instruc-
tions. This study suggests that the addition of basic trial procedures
(i.e., instructions to the jury) has a vast effect on findings of prejudice
in psycholegal research on jury decision-making. Thus, this research
forces one to question the validity of previous laboratory research
which did not employ jury instructions.
Stephan and Stephan8 9 also found that the addition of jury instruc-
tions tended to dissipate prejudicial findings in their study on juror
reactions to non-English speaking defendants. These authors found
that English subjects tended to rate Hispanic and Thai defendants as
guiltier if their testimony was presented through an interpreter rather
than in English. The discrepancy in ratings, however, disappeared
when subjects were instructed by the judge to ignore the fact that the
testimony was translated. According to Pfeifer and Ogloff,90 this dis-
sipation of racism in jury studies when instructions are added can be
87. See, e.g., Barnett & Feild, Character of the Defendant and Length of Sentence in
Rape and Burglary Crimes, 104 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 271, 276 (1978); Bermant,
McGuire, McKinley & Salo, supra note 64, at 231-32; Hendrick, Bixenstine &
Hawkins, Race Versus Belief Similarity as Determinants of Attracti" A Search
For a Fair Test, 17 J. OF PERSONAL=TY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 250 (1971); Leventhal
& Krate, Physical Attractiveness and Severity of Sentencing, 40 PSYCHOLOGICAL
REP. 315, 317 (1977); Nemeth & Sosis, A Simulated Jury Study: Characteristics of
the Defendant and Jurors, 90 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 221, 227-28 (1973); Oros &
Elnan, Impact of Judge's Instructions Upon Jurors'Decisions: The "Cautionary
Charge" in Rape Trials, 10 REPRESENTATIVE RES. IN Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 28 (1979);
Pfeifer & Ogloff, supra note 19; Stephan & Stephan, Habla Ingles? The Effects of
Language Translation on Simulated Juror Decisions, 16 J. APPLIED Soc. PSY-
CHOLOGY 577 (1986); Sunnafrank & Fontes, General and Crime Related Racial
Stereotypes and Influences on Juridic Decisions, 17 CORNELL J. Soc. REL. 1
(1982).
88. Pfeifer & Ogloff, supra note 19.
89. Stephan & Stephan, supra note 87.
90. Pfeifer & Ogloff, supra note 19.
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explained by modern racism theory. They suggest that when faced
with an ambiguous case involving a black defendant, mock jurors will
tend to fall back on their prejudicial attitudes unless instructions are
issued which disperse the ambiguity of the situation forcing mock ju-
rors to focus on the specific facts of the case as opposed to the race of
the defendant.
Similarly, Bermant, McGuire, McKinley and Salo suggest that sub-
jects tend to "fill in the gaps" with their own images of persons and
events in a trial when they are not presented with all components of a
trial (ie., opening statements, instructions, deliberations, etc.). 91
These studies certainly substantiate earlier jury research which sug-
gested that jurors are competent fact-finders who take their job seri-
ously and generally adhere to the "rules of law."92
Finally, there are studies which suggest that a number of variables
play a more important role in juror decision-making than race. These
studies, for the most part, suggest that variables such as defendant at-
tractiveness, socio-economic status, and attitude similarity play a
larger role in jurors decisions than the race of the defendant.93
It seems, therefore, that like archival research, laboratory research
on jury racism does not provide any positive proof of discriminatory
actions by jurors. The methodological limitations of the research, the
lack of strong external validity, the predictive and correspondence
limitations, and the large number of studies that refute findings of
jury racism, suggest that the previous findings in this area are far from
conclusive.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the research presented above is limited in its external
validity, it seems to suggest that juries are not particularly discrimina-
tory towards non-white defendants, even though there is some evi-
dence of juror prejudice. Accordingly, it seems that the evidence of
jury racism, thus far, is less reflective of a finding of discrimination
than a misinterpretation of data resulting in a discriminatory finding.
That is, the findings themselves have been incorrectly applied to sup-
port a concept which is far from established. If anything, jury deci-
sion-making research on racism supports only the contention that
91. Bermant, McGuire, McKinley, & Salo, supra note 64, at 232.
92. Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. CRIM. LEGAL COUNCIL 5 (1924).
93. Barnett & Feild, supta note 87; Feild, suptra note 10, at 275-80; Gleason & Harris,
Race, Socio-Economic Status, and Perceived Similarity as Determinants of
Judgements by Simulated Jurors, 3 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 175, 179-80
(1975); Hendrick, Bixenstine, & Hawkins, supra note 87; Levanthal & Krate,
supra note 87; Nemeth & Sosis, supra note 87, at 227-29; Pfeifer, Extra-Evidential
Defendant Characteristics and Juror Decision-Making (1990) (Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Ottawa).
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mock jurors may hold prejudicial attitudes toward non-white defend-
ants when they are not given jury instructions. There is little evi-
dence, however, to suggest that real jurors are adhering to these
attitudes when they determine the guilt or innocence of defendants.
The information discussed in this comment, however, is not meant
to imply that racism does not exist, or is an unimportant question in
the judicial system. Rather, this comment investigates the extent to
which current laboratory and archival data on jury racism may be
used to support the contention that juries engage in biased behaviors
when asked to assess the guilt of non-white defendants. It may be that
future research will add to our knowledge in this area. At this time,
however, it seems that the evidence regarding the effects of racism on
jury verdicts does not warrant any need for major changes in the jury
system.
Jeffrey E. Pfeifer
